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Abstract 
 
Spinoza's Ethics self-consciously follows the example of Euclid and other geometers in its use of 
axioms and definitions as the basis for derivations of hundreds of propositions of philosophical 
significance. The choices about what to define and what to leave as an undemonstrated axiom are 
clearly essential in such a project and were made by Spinoza with great care. Usually, when coming up 
with first principles in this sort of system, one aspires to have a list of axioms and definitions, each of 
which is necessary for at least one of the theorems to be proven. Spinoza's Ethics fails in this regard 
with EIa2. In this brief note, I show how Spinoza intended to and should have appealed to this axiom 
in his proof of EIp4 by appealing to parallels between the first four propositions of the Ethics and the 
correspondence with Henry Oldenburg. 
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Spinoza's Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata self-consciously follows the example of Euclid and other 
geometers in its use of axioms and definitions as the basis for derivations of hundreds of 
propositions of philosophical significance. The choices about what to define and what to leave as an 
undemonstrated axiom are clearly essential in such a project and were made by Spinoza with great 
care. Usually, when coming up with first principles in this sort of system, one aspires to have a list of 
axioms and definitions, each of which is necessary for at least one of the theorems to be proven.  
 There are certainly definitions in Euclid that fail in this regard—a large number of 
definitions of basic mathematical entities such as “number” or “point” are never mentioned in any 
proofs. This fact has naturally raised scholarly concerns about their purpose and Euclid's logical 
acumen.1 If we look at Spinoza's attempt at the Euclidean program, we notice that he is much more 
rigorous in this regard, with very few exceptions.2 The second axiom listed in the work reads: 
 
EIa2: What cannot be conceived through another, must be conceived through itself.3 
 
Id, quod per aliud non potest concipi, per se concipi debet.4 
																																																						
1 Most modern scholars no longer hold that this fact points to any failure on Euclid's part, but here is not the place to 
discuss it. I refer interested readers to Mueller, “Euclid’s Elements”; Mueller, Philosophy of Mathematics (esp. 38-40); 
Mueller, “Mathematical Starting Point”; Netz, “Shaping of Deduction” (90-103). The idea that axioms are introduced 
whenever they are needed is also a feature of 17th century texts, such as Lamy, Les Éléments. On 17th century treatments 
of axioms in geometry, see Kokomoor, “Seventeenth Century Geometry” (285 ff).  
2 Axiom 2 of the Short Physical Digression that follows EIIp13s is also never explicitly cited. 
3 Translations are from Curley, Collected Works of Spinoza. 
4 The Latin text used is that of Gebhardt, Spinoza Opera. 
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Spinoza never explicitly appeals to this axiom in the Ethics. The aim of this note is to explain how 
this axiom came into Spinoza's text and argue that it indeed should have been referenced in the 
proof of a central proposition:  
 
EIp4: Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another, either by a difference 
in the attributes of the substances or by a difference in their affections. 
 
Duae aut plures res distinctae vel inter se distinguuntur ex diversitate attributorum 
substantiarum, vel ex diversitate earundem affectionum. 
 
Both EIa2 and EIp4 are rightly considered essential parts of Spinoza's system,5 so understanding 
their relationship promises to shed light on Spinoza's thought generally. 
 There has been, so far as I know, only one previous attempt to locate this axiom in a 
particular place in the text of the Ethics, that of Proietti, “Un assioma inutile in Spinoza”, whose 
solution is endorsed by Mignini, Spinoza Opere (1630). On this interpretation, EIa2 must be used in 
the proof of EIp10, which I quote here in full: 
 
EIp10: Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself.  
Dem.: For an attribute is what the intellect perceives concerning a substance, as constituting 
its essence (by EId4); so (by EId3) it must be conceived through itself, q.e.d.6 
 
Our question must be: does everything need to be conceived either through another or through 
itself in order for this demonstration to work? Clearly, the answer is no. Spinoza here is only making 
a claim about attributes of substances, which are conceived through themselves by definition. If 
there are other beings which are inconceivable, they are not substances and hence not in the scope 
of the claim of EIp10. Thus, this solution is a non-starter, since it does not identify a real gap in the 
argument that the unused axiom could fill. 
 Before moving to my positive proposal, it will be helpful to consider two other responses to 
the puzzle, which seek to dispel it without claiming that any of the particular proofs in the text has a 
gap. First, one might think that there are various places that Spinoza could have appealed to it instead 
of another axiom, but did not bother to mention it. For example, according to Bledin, Gartenberg, 
and Melamed, “Ethica more logico demonstrata”, where Spinoza appeals to EIa1 in, for example, EIp4 
and EIp6c, he could have run the proof just as well by replacing a1 with a2. This has the advantage 
of solving the puzzle without faulting any proofs in the Ethics as we have it. There are two 
																																																						
5 EIa2 is linked to Spinoza's rationalism and commitment to the principle of sufficient reason by Della Rocca, Spinoza; 
Garrett, Nature and Necessity (55); Lin, “Principle”; Lin, “Metaphysical Rationalism”; Melamed, “Spinoza on Inherence”. 
For a skeptical take, see Schneider, “Spinoza’s PSR”. EIp4 is the most important premise in Spinoza's argument for 
monism beginning in EIp5 and culminating in EIp15. 
6 Unumquodque unius substantiae attributum per se concipi debet. Demonstratio. Attributum enim est id, quod 
intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejus essentiam constituens (per defin. 4.); adeoque (per defin. 3.) per se concipi 
debet. Q. e. d. 
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disadvantages to the approach. First, EIa2 still does not really need to be in the text. That everything 
in the world is conceivable seems to be a strong and interesting view, but on this interpretation, 
there is no claim in Spinoza that relies on it being true. So from the point of view of the geometrical 
method, Spinoza is still making a mistake by including it in his list. But on a more textual level, it 
would be surprising if Spinoza did not mention the possibility that is alluded to by this 
interpretation. In a number of propositions, he specifically mentions more than one way of proving 
a proposition but he does not do it in the relevant passages as Bledin, Gartenberg, and Melamed's 
interpretation would predict. One particularly striking example is EIp6c, which Spinoza gives 
multiple arguments for, none of which cite a2. So while this approach gives some work for a2 to do, it 
is not very much work and it is also not work that Spinoza gives any indication of it doing. The 
interpretation offered below improves on Bledin, Gartenberg, and Melamed's on both of these 
scores. 
 A second possible solution, inspired by Della Rocca's work, although not explicitly endorsed 
by him, would posit EIa2 as a background assumption guiding the operation of the entire system 
without being needed in any of the proofs.7 The idea is that, the intelligibility of the world is somehow 
built into the Spinozan framework, but is not an explicit proposition that is used in one or another 
proof. Like Bledin, Gartenberg, and Melamed, this can help us understand the significance of the 
axiom without placing it in a specific part of the text. But this interpretation nevertheless has the 
disadvantage of making this one axiom completely different in its operation from every other axiom 
(and definition) in the Ethics. Such an exception surely could have been noted, but was not. Indeed, 
the very fact that this axiom lies directly between two that are appealed to so explicitly and 
prominently in the first book of the Ethics (a1 is first mentioned in EIp4d, a3 in p27d) would make a 
reader expect that it should appear at least once in a proof.  
 Considering this solution, however, helps us to see a major desideratum of a good 
interpretation. What we want, if possible, is a way of integrating this axiom in a way that makes it 
not too unlike the other axioms and definitions, which have specific places in specific arguments for 
specific conclusions. This seems to me to be generally desirable, both based on considerations 
internal to Spinoza's text and due to the genre of geometrical text that the Ethics is imitating. Axioms 
in geometrical texts, both ancient and modern, are there to be used in proofs.  
 It is surprising that there has not been greater interest in solving this problem in the 
Anglophone literature, since this axiom contains one of Spinoza's clearest statements of the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). In the work of Della Rocca, Garrett, Lin, and Melamed, EIa2 
is frequently mentioned as a principle that Spinoza could appeal to to defend various theses. These 
authors, however, do not give sufficient attention to the fact that, as the text stands, none of the 
amazing propositions of the Ethics explicitly depend in any way shape or form on this axiom. 
 In what follows, I suggest that if we follow the trail of the early letters to Henry Oldenburg, 
we find Spinoza explicitly appealing to EIa2 and this appeal can lead us to a place in the Ethics where 
																																																						
7 An alternative reading of Della Rocca would have it that EIa2 is appealed to implicitly in a number of proofs. This 
alternative is not really distinct from the sort of solution that I myself (or Proietti/Mignini) will go on to suggest. This is 
why I say that the solution canvased above is “inspired” by Della Rocca. 
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we need the axiom.8 The claim here is not that this is the only place where Spinoza should have also 
appealed to EIa2, but merely that here we have evidence that Spinoza intended to appeal to it.9 In 
the Appendix to the second letter, which is unfortunately lost, Spinoza aimed to show in a 
geometrical manner the following propositions: 
 
[P1] That two substances cannot exist in nature unless they differ in their whole essence; 
[P2] That a substance cannot be produced, but that it is of its essence to exist;  
[P3] That every substance must be infinite, or supremely perfect in its kind. (Ep 2, IV/8/7-
10)10 
 
In the main text of the letter, Spinoza gives us two of the definitions he used: 
 
[D1] God, whom I define as a Being consisting of infinite attributes, each of which is 
infinite, or supremely perfect in its kind. [...]  
[D2] By attribute I understand whatever is conceived through itself and in itself, so that its 
concept does not involve the concept of another thing. (Ep 2, IV/7/23-28)11 
 
We can tentatively reconstruct, based on Oldenburg's reply and Spinoza's reply to Oldenburg, some 
of what must have been in the Appendix. In the third letter, Oldenburg objects: 
 
Third, do you regard the axioms you communicated to me as indemonstrable Principles, 
known by the light of Nature and requiring no proof? Perhaps the first is of that kind, but I 
do not see how the other three can be so regarded. The second supposes that [A2] nothing 
exists in Nature except Substances and Accidents, but many maintain that time and place are 
neither. I am so far from conceiving clearly your third axiom—[A3] Things which have different 
attributes have nothing in common with one another—that the whole universe of Things seems 
rather to prove its contrary. For all Things known to us both differ from one another in 
some respects and agree in others. Finally, the fourth axiom—[A4] If things have nothing in 
common with one another, one cannot be the cause of the other—is not so evident to my dull intellect 
that it does not need more light shed on it. Surely God has nothing formally in common 
with created things, yet nearly all of us regard him as their cause. (Ep 3, IV/10/29-11/14, my 
numbering of the axioms) 
																																																						
8 On the letters, see Newlands, Reconceiving Spinoza (71 ff). The Appendix to the second letter is reconstructed by Battisti, 
“La dimostrazione dell’esistenza” and Hubelling, “The Development”. On the place of the letters in Spinoza's 
development of geometric method, see Melamed, “The Earliest Draft”. 
9 I suspect, although I do not have the textual evidence to secure it, that usually when Spinoza refers to the claim that 
everything in nature is either a substance or accident, he is implicitly appealing to a2, for reasons that will become clear 
below. 
10 Primo, quod in rerum natura non possunt existere duae substantiae, quin tota essentia differant. Secundo, substantiam 
non posse produci; sed quod sit de ipsius essentia existere. Tertio, quod omnis substantia debeat esse infinita, sive 
summe perfecta in suo genere[...] 
11 De Deo itaque incipiam breviter dicere; quem definio esse Ens, constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque est 
infinitum, sive summè perfectum in suo genere. [...] Ubi notandum, me per attributum intelligere omne id, quod 
concipitur per se, & in se; adeo ut ipsius conceptus non involvat conceptum alterius rei. 
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The general tenor of Oldenburg's worry is clear enough. Spinoza's axioms cannot be too 
controversial if he is going to prove things with them. Many views, not just of normal people, but 
reflective philosophers, are inconsistent with those axioms. Spinoza replies, in a somewhat surprising 
manner, by proving these four propositions: 
 
Your third objection against the things I proposed is that the Axioms ought not to be 
counted as common Notions. I have no quarrel with that. But you also doubt their truth; 
indeed you seem to want to show that their contrary is more likely. So please attend to the 
definitions I gave of Substance and of Accident, from which all these [axioms] are derived. 
For by Substance I understand what is conceived through itself and in itself, i.e., that whose 
concept does not involve the concept of another thing; but by modification, or Accident, 
what is in another and is conceived through what it is in. From this it is clear that:  
[A1] Substance is by nature prior to its Accidents, for without it, they can neither be nor be 
conceived.  
[A2] Except for Substances and Accidents, nothing exists in reality, or outside the intellect,  
for whatever there is, is conceived either through itself or through another, and its 
concept either does or does not involve the concept of another thing, [Nam quicquid 
datur, vel per se, vel per aliud concipitur, & ipsius conceptus vel involvit conceptum alterius rei, vel non 
involvit.] 
[A3] Things which have different attributes have nothing in common with one another,  
for I have explained that an attribute is that whose concept does not involve the concept of 
another thing.  
[A4] If two things have nothing in common with one another, one cannot be the cause of 
the other,  
for since there would be nothing in the effect which it had in common with the cause, 
whatever the effect had, it would have from nothing. (Ep 4, IV/13/26-14/11) 
 
I have retained Curley's formatting, but it is relatively clear from the parallels between A1, A2, A3, 
and A4 that the bolded section is meant to justify the inference from the definitions of substance 
and accident to A2 alone. This bolded section (which I will call A2') is the key, for it is logically 
equivalent to EIa2.12 At the risk of pedantry, I will give a quick argument for this. Suppose A2' and x 
cannot be conceived through another. Since everything is conceived through itself or another, it 
must be conceived through itself. Thus A2' implies EIa2. For the other direction, suppose EIa2. 
Now suppose not A2' for reductio. Then there is an x that is neither conceived through itself or 
through another. But by EIa2, if x is not conceived through another, x is conceived through itself. 
Contradiction. 
 I assume in this argument that EIa2 should be read as “if x isn't conceived through itself, x 
is conceived through another”, but there is another option for understanding the axiom that is 
occasionally aired in the literature, for instance, in Schneider (2014). On this weaker reading, EIa2 
																																																						
12 Pace Newlands, Reconceiving Spinoza (72), who claims that it is “an early version of” EIa1. 
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says “if x is conceived, if x isn't conceived through itself, x is conceived through another.” If we take 
this reading, EIa2 is obviously much weaker than A2. The argument in favor of this reading is that it 
better parallels EIa1: omnia quae sunt, vel in se vel in alio sunt. Just as there is a restriction to the 
things which are in the a1, so too in a2 there should be a parallel restriction, which would be to 
those things which are conceived. But we should not be persuaded by this argument. The two 
axioms are evidently not linguistically parallel and so we should not try to insert a parallel restriction. 
On the one hand, a1 has an explicit quantifier, which is not present in a2. Moreover, a1 has a 
restriction marked by “quae” followed by a (presumably exclusive) disjunction, while there is clearly 
no such disjunction in a2. Furthermore, there is already a restriction mentioned in a2 in a relative 
clause: that x cannot be conceived thought another. There is simply no grammatical space for 
another restriction unless we are also meant to supply a second relative clause. Finally, if we build in 
the proposed restriction, the axiom approaches triviality: everything that is conceived is either 
conceived through itself or something else—who would have thought otherwise? For these reasons, 
it is preferable to go with the traditional reading of a2 and read it as equivalent to A2. 
 So we have identified the earliest occurrence in Spinoza of the mysterious axiom and see it is 
used to prove something. One does not have to look far to see where this point comes into play, for 
all of A1-4 have parallels as propositions or lemmata to propositions in the Ethics. I bold the 
linguistic parallels in the Latin so that we can see just how closely these are related. 
 
  Appendix Ethics 
  A1[= Ep 4, IV/14/1]: Substance is by nature 
prior to its Accidents. 
Substantia sit prior natura suis 
Accidentibus. 
EIp1: A substance is prior in nature to its 
affections. 
Substantia prior est natura suis 
affectionibus. 
  A2[= Ep 4, IV/14/2-4]: Except for 
Substances and Accidents, nothing exists in 
reality, or outside the intellect. 
Praeter Substantias, & Accidentia nihil 
detur realiter, sive extra intellectum. 
EIp4d: Whatever is, is either in itself or in 
another (by EIal), i.e. (by EId3 and EId5), 
outside the intellect there is nothing except 
substances and their affections. 
Omnia, quae sunt, vel in se, vel in alio sunt 
(per axiom. 1.), hoc est (per defin. 3. et 5.), 
extra intellectum nihil datur praeter 
substantias earumque affectiones. 
  A3[= Ep 4, IV/14/6-7]: Things which have 
different attributes have nothing in common 
with one another. 
Res, quae diversa habent attributa, nihil 
habent inter se commune. 
EIp2: Two substances having different 
attributes have nothing in common with one 
another. 
Duae substantiae, diversa attributa 
habentes, nihil inter se commune habent. 
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A4[= Ep 4, IV/14/9-10]: If two things have 
nothing in common with one another, one 
cannot be the cause of the other. 
Rerum, quae nihil commune habent inter 
se, una alterius causa esse non potest. 
EIp3: If things have nothing in common with 
one another, one of them cannot be the cause 
of the other. 
Quae res nihil commune inter se habent, 
earum una alterius causa esse non potest. 
   
We see a general pattern: Spinoza realized here that the claims he originally presented as axioms in 
the Appendix, like Oldenburg said, are all in need of some justification. This is what he meant by 
saying that they are not “common notions”. Moreover, he primarily appeals in these places to 
exactly what he told Oldenburg to attend to: the definitions of Substance and Accident (EId3 and 
EId5). These are the only assumptions referenced in EIp1-2. In the relevant part of the 
demonstration of EIp4d, he only appeals to d3, d5, and a1.13 So, modulo EIp3, Spinoza has made 
good on his claim that the propositions follow from the definitions of substance and 
accident/affection.14 
 For our purposes, of course, it is the parallel to A2 that matters most. Here it seems that 
Spinoza has replaced the appeal to A2'/EIa2 with an appeal to EIa1 (and still appealing to the same 
definitions). But inspection of the reasoning suggests that what Spinoza directly cites is not in fact 
sufficient to prove what he wants to prove. Recall that substance and mode were each defined by a 
pair of properties: 
 
EId3: By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that 
whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be 
formed. 
 
Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est et per se concipitur; hoc est id, cujus conceptus 
non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat.  
 
EId5: By mode I understand the affections of a substance, or that which is in another 
through which it is also conceived. 
 
Per modum intelligo substantiae affectiones, sive id, quod in alio est, per quod etiam 
concipitur.  
 
																																																						
13 While it does not have great bearing on the argument that I am making here, it is important to note several differences 
in both terminology and argument in these otherwise parallel passages. In the Appendix, Spinoza prefers to contrast 
substance with its accidents, while in the Ethics, he contrasts it with affections. There may be significance in this shift, but it 
may also be simple varatio. However, a major difference between A3 and EIp2 is that the latter only applies to 
substances, whereas the former applies to “things” generally. Finally EIp3 appeals to two axioms (EIa4 and EIa5) not 
mentioned in the Appendix, which gives a very different demonstration of this proposition. 
14 The case of EIp3/A3 is peculiar. In the Ethics, Spinoza appeals to EIa4 and a5, but even in the Appendix, it is clear 
that the justification for A3 has very little to do with the definitions. 
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If Spinoza shows that everything is in something else or itself, that does not suffice to show that 
everything is either a substance or accident, since there could be (say) something inconceivable 
which is in itself or something inconceivable which is in something else.  ∀𝑥 𝐹𝑥 ∧ 𝐺𝑥 ∨
𝐹′𝑥 ∧ 𝐺′𝑥  simply does not follow from ∀𝑥 𝐹𝑥 ∨ 𝐹′𝑥 . Adding EIa2 rules out this possibility 
and, since this was a principle that Spinoza himself thought was needed when proving this very 
proposition elsewhere, the absence of the reference here is not due to a larger failing in his 
reasoning. 
 There is, nevertheless, a lingering gap in the argument. Why couldn't something be in itself 
but conceived through another?15 This would be consistent with both EIa1 and EIa2, but not with 
EIp4d. I suggest that Spinoza must here be operating with a relatively weak background assumption: 
if x is conceived through y and x is in z, y=z.16 This is already in a way built into EId3 and 5, as the 
latter specifically assumes that what the mode is in is the very thing through which it is conceived. 
Once we have this assumption, then the claim in EIp4d that everything is either a substance or an 
accident does indeed follow from EIa1 and EIa2.17 
 An alternative solution would be simply to claim, as some have, that there is no difference in 
Spinoza between causation and inherence.18 If that were so, we could dispense with EIa2 entirely 
and have the claim that everything is a substance or accident follow merely from EIa1. It is not my 
place here to wade into the deep debate on inherence and conception in general in Spinoza.19 This is 
because I can stay neutral on the question of whether they end up coming to the same thing. What I 
want to resist is that Spinoza simply assumes at the outset of the Ethics that they are the same. I see 
no reason to believe this and it is difficult to square with the fact that they are apparently 
distinguished, for example, in the conjunctive definitions of substance and accident and the fact that 
EIa1 and EIa2 would otherwise collapse. The correspondence with Oldenburg shows that Spinoza 
is attentive to what a reader is willing to accept as an axiom and what they need to have 
demonstrated. It seems to me highly unlikely that he would set up the text of the Ethics in such a 
way as to generate the expectation in the reader that there are two relations, being in and being conceived 
through, but then throughout all of his argumentation act as if they were the same. 
																																																						
15 A problem already noted by Leibniz in his notes on the Ethics (Gerhardt, Die philosophischen Schriften, 139). 
16 I say “relatively weak” because this assumption itself has some rather counterintuitive consequences when paired with 
Spinoza's views about causation (Melamed, “Spinoza on Inherence”), but it is weaker than other candidate assumptions 
to save the argument, such as the one discussed in the next paragraph, which says that x is conceived through y if and 
only if x is in y. 
17 In this way, it might be thought that a1 and a2 underpin d3 and d5. If this is the case, why doesn’t Spinoza himself 
directly connect them, as he so explicitly did in the letter to Oldenburg? There, recall, he did not separately mention 
these axioms, but simply used them as “inference tickets” when applying his definitions of substance and accident. No 
such connection is apparent in the Ethics. However, it is reasonable to think he still has this in mind, since a1 is usually 
mentioned alongside the definitions of substance and/or mode (e.g., EIp4, p6, p15, p28; exceptions are p11d3, p14c2). 
The exceptions, however, show that by the time he wrote the Ethics, Spinoza was also interested in implications of these 
principles that do not immediately require d3 and d5. This suggests that the definitions and the axioms can, to a certain 
extent, each stand on their own. 
18 Most notably, perhaps, Della Rocca, Spinoza. 
19 On this, see for example Della Rocca, Spinoza; Garrett, Nature and Necessity; Melamed, “Spinoza on Inherence”; 
Morrison, “Conception and Causation”; Newlands, Reconceiving Spinoza. 
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 With this in hand, we can now see an important role for our missing axiom. EIp4 is 
undoubtedly a linchpin of Spinoza's system and we have shown not only that the missing axiom was 
conceived of by Spinoza to be part of its justification, but that Spinoza was right to include it.  
I will conclude by showing how this discovery sheds new light on another of Spinoza's 
statements of the PSR in the second proof of EIp11d:  
 
For each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, as much for its existence as for its 
nonexistence. 
 
Cuiuscumque rei assignari debet causa seu ratio, tam cur existit, quam cur non existit.  
 
 
How should Spinoza justify this claim? According to Don Garrett, it is not itself directly justified: 
 
It should be emphasized again, however, that Spinoza’s own later expressions of the PSR or 
its corollaries—for example, the principle in the second proof in 1p11d that there must be a 
cause for the existence or nonexistence of each thing—do not actually cite any axiomatic 
basis for it. (Garrett, Nature and Necessity, 56) 
 
But let us follow the trail back from what is cited in EIp11d2: namely p7 [it is of the nature of 
substance to exist]. This proposition depends on EIp6c, EIp6c depends on EIp6 and a1/d3/d5 (and 
probably also a2, since Spinoza cites these in EIp6c in support of the claim that everything is 
substance or mode, which is exactly what he needed a2 for in EIp4). EIp6 depends on EIp5 and 
EIp5 on EIp4, which is where I claimed a2 should have been used. Thus this investigation has 
revealed that Garrett’s “axiomatic basis” is built already into EIp7 and thus into EIp11d2.  
 Moreover, it makes sense that a2 would be in the background of E1p11d2, since d3 and d5 
require substance and modes respectively to be explained/caused, because inherence suffices for 
causation.20 Thus, substances are caused by themselves, while modes by what they inhere in. Since 
he uses a1/a2/d3/d5 in EIp4d to show that there is nothing besides substance and modes, these 
axioms and definitions together suffice for the claim that all things that exist have a cause for their 
existence, which is the first half of the EIp11d2 statement of the PSR. For the notorious negative 
half, that things that don’t exist also need a cause for their non-existence, this claim also seems to help, 
although the reasoning is not as direct. First, assume that all possible things are either substances or 
modes. Then we have the following situation: if the possible thing is a substance, then it exists from 
its own nature. Thus any non-existent thing must be a mode. Since an underlying substance causes 
the modes that do exist to exist, it stands to reason that a substance would also cause the non-
existing modes not to exist. Otherwise, the absence of the mode (which is presumably also some 
“thing” in the broad sense of “something demanding a causal explanation”) would not have a cause. 
																																																						
20 Although Spinoza is not especially forthcoming about the issue, scholars tend to agree he is committed to the principle 
that inherence implies causation (see, e.g., EIp16, which is explicit about the particular case of God). Scholars are 
divided, however, about the converse principle that causation implies inherence, and I am here taking no stand on this 
issue. For discussion, see the works cited in note 19 above. 
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If the ontology extended beyond substances and modes (to include, for example, time and place, as 
Henry Oldenburg suggested above), there may be entities that need not be caused. In this case, it 
would be difficult to see why, for those things, if they didn’t exist, there would need to be a cause 
for them. In conclusion, we can see why the lemma that everything is a substance or mode, 
substantiated by d3/d5/a1 and crucially a2, can support what is one of the seemingly strongest 
statements of the PSR in Spinoza. 
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